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I
Between 1820 and 1845 a substantial num ber o f  m en in B ogota’s upper 
sector m ade som e m odest, but nonetheless notable, efforts at the estab­
lishm ent o f m odern manufacturing. In these years they established an 
ironworks and a porcelain manufactury and they attem pted to  found 
paper, glass and cotton textile factories. W hat is striking about these 
efforts is the fact that they occurred in the context o f  commercial crisis 
and econom ic stagnation.
This paper will sketch the econom ic context and aspects o f  the ideologi­
cal environm ent in which these m odern factory enterprises were initi­
ated. W hile there were several m otivations for upper-class efforts to 
im plant m odern factories, two central ones were l) the desire to  m odern­
ize the country, in order to  bring it in to  line w ith standards prevailing in 
W estern Europe and the U nited States; and 2) the need to cope with the 
commercial crisis and econom ic stagnation afflicting the country in these 
years. The concern to  m odernize can be seen also in parallel efforts to 
develop transportation, establish mass public education, and introduce 
the latest conceptions o f European natural science and social thought 
into higher education.1 As this concern to  m odernize has been discussed 
elsewhere and as the topic o f this conference is economic relations be­
tween Europe and Latin America in the period, I will not elaborate much 
on the m odernization them e. Rather I will particularly discuss the impact 
o f Colom bia’s (later N ew  G ranada’s) econom ic relations w ith Europe in 
the period, the ways in which these relations created a commercial crisis 
in the new republic, and the thinking o f  the country’s political and eco­
nom ic elites about how  to deal w ith the crisis. In general one may say that
1 On efforts at transportation modernization, see Gilmore and Harrison (1948); on 
developments in education and other aspects o f institutional modernization, 
Bushnell (1954); on efforts to introduce the latest in natural science and change 
professional orientations and attitudes toward work, Safford (1976: particularly 
chaps. 2 and 4).
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the econom ic crisis o f  1825-45 encouraged som e in the N ew  Granadan 
elite to  contem plate the developm ent o f  an early form o f im port-substi- 
tu tion  m anufacturing and to  advocate a protectionist policy in its sup­
port. Nevertheless, supporters o f protectionism  may well have been in a 
minority am ong the elite, and their only period o f relative political 
strength was in the 1830s, m ost particularly between 1831 and 1834. 
New Granadan leaders were temporarily buoyed by the enthusiasm  of 
Independence. Like many Europeans at the time, upper-class New G ra­
nadans believed that Spanish m isgovernm ent was chiefly responsible for 
the country’s backwardness and poverty. Once the burden o f Spanish 
colonial rule was rem oved, they believed, they could begin to move clos­
er to  the economic, institutional, and ideological standards then prevail­
ing in the m ore advanced European countries. Republican governm ent, 
rational econom ic policies, and the im m igration o f  foreign capital, tech­
nique, and skilled labor would bring rapid grow th. There was, therefore, 
an openness to  change, particularly in the 1820s but also in the 1830s, 
which provided an environm ent in som e ways receptive to  new tech­
niques.
T he post-independence desire for change was encouraged by the arrival 
in N ew  G ranada o f  substantial am ounts o f  foreign capital, for the m ost 
part British, as well as a m odest num ber o f  foreign entrepreneurs. The 
capital came in part in the form o f  loans contracted by the governm ent o f 
Colombia in England between 1822 and 1825.2
A second major source o f capital was the British-owned Colombian M in­
ing Association, capitalized at a million pounds, which in 1824 won a con­
tract to  revive and operate the flooded and abandoned silver mines o f 
Mariquita. Lesser, but still significant, am ounts o f capital came from  a few 
individual entrepreneurs. M ost notable am ong these was John  Bernhard 
Elbers, a German-English m erchant resident in Jamaica during the Inde­
pendence years, w ho had extended wartim e credit for arms and m uni­
tions to the insurgent Colombian governm ent and in 1823 won a twenty- 
year m onopoly privilege to  operate steam boats on the Magdalena River. 
By the end o f  the 1820s Elbers had spent m ore than 236,000 pesos on the 
steam boat enterprise, much o f this, however, in the U nited States where 
he bought his first steam boats (R estrepo 1952: 135-137; Gilm ore and 
Harrison 1948: 335-344).
Along with this British capital there came a num ber o f  fortune-seeking 
immigrants from various parts o f  Europe as well as the U nited States.
2 “Deuda estranjera,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca ( Bogotá, Apr. 30, 1837).
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Many o f these immigrants lacked notable capital resources, but they 
brought a spirit o f enterprise which was fed by a mistaken belief in New 
G ranada’s im m ediate economic potential. M ost o f these fortune-seekers 
shared with the N ew  G ranadan elite the assum ption that Spanish rule 
was principally responsible for the country’s economic backwardness. 
They believed that the new nation, freed from the pernicious effects o f 
Spanish tyranny, could begin to develop long-neglected natural 
resources, particularly with the aid o f W estern European econom ic and 
technical tutelage. A m ong the first elem ents o f foreign enterprise were 
the British merchants who arrived in the p o rt o f Cartagena as early as 
1812, during the earliest stage o f  Colom bia’s prolonged struggle for Inde­
pendence. O thers were British military adventurers, contracted to fight 
the Wars o f Independence after 1815, a small num ber o f w hom  stayed in 
New Granada to  seek their El D orado in m ore peaceful ways. Finally, dur­
ing the 1820s larger contingents arrived. T he British silver-mining com ­
pany sent som e 191 engineers and miners during the 1820s, and other 
m ining engineers — m ost notably Britons and Swedes —gravitated to the 
gold-m ining regions o f  Antioquia. M erchants from France and other 
Continental nations joined earlier arrivals from G reat Britain and the 
U nited States in the port cities and other commercial centers (Safford 
1965: 509-514).
The fortune-hunting Europeans stim ulated many new enterprises. 
W hether arriving as military officers or as merchants, they soon perceived 
a variety o f new, previously neglected opportunities. Converging on 
Bogotá, they sought governm ent concessions or patents to  establish new 
enterprises or to  manage old ones. O ne Briton threw  his energies into 
hunting for pre-Colom bian treasure by systematically draining Lake 
Guatavita o f El D orado fame. Some sought to introduce im proved 
m ethods in the governm ent’s salt mines at Z ipaquirá and others tried to 
establish new branches o f  manufacture, such as a paper mill.5 
The inflow o f foreign capital and the activities o f the foreign en trepre­
neurs helped to  create an atm osphere o f optim ism , and hence o f en ter­
prise am ong the Colombian upper class. To carry forward their projects 
the foreign adventurers often linked up with m em bers o f the Colombian 
upper class, either because they needed their capital resources or, m ore 
likely, because it was politically expedient. Thus some Colombians soon 
became directly involved in the process o f econom ic m odernization.
3 Safford (1965: 509 514); Cochrane (1825,II: 175,185,192 208); Humphreys (1940: 
269-271).
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Foreign in terest in Colombia, however, did no t long sustain the th rust o f 
the early 1820s. For a variety o f reasons Britons and other foreigners soon 
concluded that this El D orado was very thinly gilded. T he M ariquita sil­
ver mines did no t bring the early return which the Colombian Mining 
Association had hoped for; against m ore than a million pesos plunged 
into the mines, the com pany by 1836 had managed to extract only 138,000 
pesos o f silver (Restrepo 1952:135-137). O thers suffered m ore dramatic 
d isappointm ents as the political conflict and instability o f  1826-31 com ­
bined w ith the fundam ental poverty o f the country to frustrate the hopes 
o f  European investors and entrepreneurs. British investors w ho had 
bought Colombian bonds w ith a nom inal value o f  more than £ 6 ,750,0 00 
between 1822 and 1825 soon learned that this debt was a burden too 
heavy for the Colombian econom y to bear. In 1826 the Colombian 
governm ent defaulted on its interest paym ents, quotations on these 
bonds fell to catastrophic levels, and the British public lost any further 
in terest in this form  o f  investm ent in Colom bia (Jenks 1927: 44-49, 
63-64; Rippy 1959: 19-21). Some individual entrepreneurs in Colombia 
also had reason to  feel either bilked or deeply disappointed. Elbers, the 
steam boat entrepreneur, after his considerable individual investm ent, 
was stripped o f  his m onopoly privilege for failing fully to comply with its 
term s (G ilm ore and Harrison 1948: 344-348; Safford 1965: 510-515). 
Aside from  the unfortunate experiences o f  these early foreign en ter­
prises, the political atm osphere o f Colombia (the republic that until the 
end o f the 1820s embraced Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador) un ­
doubtedly contributed to the disenchantm ent o f  foreign interests. The 
period from  1826 through 1831 was filled with factional strife. The Presi­
den t o f the Republic, Simón Bolívar, backed by New G ranadan and Vene­
zuelan adherents w ho favored his plan for a strong semi-monarchical 
governm ent, was p itted  against the Vice-President, General Francisco de 
Paula Santander, and his New G ranadan followers w ho were determ ined 
to  retain a republican system m ore closely m odelled on that o f the 
United States. This struggle became entangled with regional rivalries 
between Venezuelans and N ew  Granadans. This regional rivalry in turn 
was expressed in terms o f  conflict between civilians and military, as the 
Venezuelans dom inated the military while N ew  Granadans occupied the 
bulk o f the positions in civil governm ent.T hese intertw ined conflicts led 
successively to  establishm ent o f dictatorial rule by Bolivar, an assassina­
tion attem pt against Bolivar (1828), the collapse o f the governm ent o f 
Colom bia (each o f its three com ponents form ing a separate republic), 
Bolivar’s resignation, the seizure o f pow er in New Granada by the Vene-
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zuelan General Rafael U rdaneta (1830), and finally, U rdaneta’s expulsion 
in 1831. N ew  Granadan leaders in 1831 managed to establish a republican 
governm ent that endured w ithout overthrow  for m ore than twenty 
years. In the early 1830s, however, the reborn republic was challenged by a 
series o f conspiracies that kept the political class in a dither and m ust also 
have induced caution am ong potential econom ic entrepreneurs. W hile 
the country rem ained relatively peaceful between 1834 and 1839, it was 
riven by a major civil war between 1839 and 1842. Thus in the years 
between 1825 and 1850, N ew  G ranada offered a political environm ent 
that was not particularly conducive to  enterprise, w hether foreign or na­
tional.
The sad experiences o f those who invested in Colombia in the 1820s and 
the political disturbances o f 1826-1831 shaped a new attitude o f Euro­
peans towards the country. Accounts o f  the country published by 
foreigners in the early 1820s tended to glow  with optim ism  about the 
future o f  Colombia (in som e cases because they were w ritten to  help puff 
bond sales in London). By contrast, foreign accounts w ritten after 1830 
tend to  take a m ore jaundiced view, em phasizing the deficiences o f New 
Granadans as a people and o f N ew  G ranadan society rather than the 
potential o f their natural resources.
After about 1830, therefore, foreign interests, w ith few exceptions, shied 
away from N ew  Granada. The N ew  G ranadan upper class was left funda­
mentally on its own and in very difficult circumstances. O ne o f  the m ost 
pressing problem s o f the period from 1825 through 1845 was a chronic 
imbalance in foreign trade, which caused local currency to be drained off 
as exchange.
T he trade deficits o f these years apparently were m ore acute than any in 
the m em ory o f N ew  Granadans. In the late colonial period, while Spanish 
restrictions and the high cost o f im ported goods had lim ited im ports, 
N ew  G ranada had enjoyed some temporary, and m odest, success in 
exporting cinchona bark and cotton to Europe and cacao to  Mexico.4 
Independence, however, brought bo th  a welling flow o f im ported goods 
and a sharp decline o f agricultural exports. The low cost o f  British goods 
in relation to colonial price levels, along with the influence o f the 
foreigners newly arrived in N ew  Granada, induced a dramatic change in 
consum ption patterns am ong the upper and middle sectors, w ho began
4 Fermín de Vargas (1953: 23,41-43); reports ofViceroys D.José de Ezpeleta (1796) 
and D. Pedro Mendinueta (1803) in Posada and Ibáñez (1910: 350-354, 508-511), 
and in Giraldo Jaramillo (1954: 174-177, 215-218); Pombo (1921: 692-693).
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to  dress themselves and to  refurnish their hom es as much as possible 
according to European m odes.’ In addition, N ew  G ranada was now 
im porting m ore agricultural com m odities than in the colonial era, in part 
because o f  declining dom estic production, in part because o f foreign 
price com petition. W heat rust (polvillo) had severely reduced grain crops 
in places as widely separated as the Sabana de Bogotá and Sonsón in the 
province o f  Antioquia. Because o f  declining productivity as well as N orth 
American com petition, New Granadan wheat producers had lost many 
dom estic markets they formerly supplied in the colonial period. In fact, 
supplies were short even in som e o f the wheat-growing areas.6 Similarly, 
by the end o f the 1820s, the N ew  G ranadan tobacco industry, partly 
because o f  a shortage o f capital in the governm ent tobacco monopoly, 
was no longer able to  supply dom estic dem and, so that Virginia tobacco 
had to be im ported. Even N ew  Granadan anís was having to give way in 
dom estic markets before French com petition.7
W hile im portations increased dramatically, som e o f New G ranada’s 
principal agricultural exports fell into discard. New G ranadan cinchona 
bark, which enjoyed a tem porary boom  between 1802 and 1808, had been 
discredited before the beginning o f the independence m ovem ent by 
shipm ents containing worthless bark. Before independence cotton also 
was exported bo th  from the Caribbean coast and from the interior 
region o f G irón. By 1830, however, shipm ents from the interior had 
stopped entirely and those from the coast were insignificant. N ew  G ra­
nadan producers could no longer com pete with those in the United 
States, both because o f  the high cost o f  processing (they lacked gins) and 
because o f high transportation costs from the interior. Finally, exports o f 
cacao to Mexico from  the region o f Cdcuta (via Lake Maracaibo) and 
from the lower Magdalena valley were killed by wartim e losses ofplanta- 
tion-ow ners and merchants, by bad harvests in som e areas, and byaprohi-
5 Informe del diputado consular de Medellin, July 2, 1831, and report o f Rufino 
Cuervo, Governor o f Bogotá province, to Minister o f Interior, Dec. 15,1831, ANB, 
Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 75-78,180-182; “El lujo,” Constitucional 
del Cauca (Popayán, Nov. 10, 1832); “Pobreza,” Constitucional de Antioquia (Me­
dellin, Feb. 10, 1833).
6 Informe del diputado consular de Mompox, Nov. 5,1830; Informe del diputado 
consular de Bogotá,June 7,1831, and Informe del diputado consular de Rionegro, 
July 9,1831, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 171-173,195-197,203- 
206.
7 Informe del diputado consular de Mompox, Nov. 5, 1830, and Informe del dipu­
tado consular de Bogotá, June 7, 1831, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 
161, fols. 180-182, 203; Wills (1831: 10-11).
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bitive duty levied by M exico’s republican governm ent.8 Consequently 
the only notable export remaining to  New Granada in the 1820s and 
1830s was the gold extracted from Antioquia, the Chocó, the Cauca, and, 
in smaller am ounts, the province o f Neiva in the upper M agdalena valley. 
Furtherm ore, gold production also had declined between 1810 and 1830 
because o f wartim e disruption.
Exports o f  gold, w hether legally in the form  o f coin or as contraband in 
gold dust, were therefore insufficient to balance the increased im ports o f 
the period. Already in 1822-23 Gaspard T heodore Mollien noted that 
N ew  G ranada’s im ports exceeded its exports by 500,000 pesos per year. 
Lacking any other means to make up the exchange deficit, many in the 
New G ranadan upper class were m elting dow n their jewelry and silver­
ware in order to be able to  pay for im ported goods (Mollien 1824: 376, 
385-386). In the middle o f the 1820s, the exchange imbalance was 
relieved temporarily by the inflow o f foreign loans to the governm ent 
and capital invested by British m ining companies. By the end o f the 
1820s, however, the flow o f funds from both  sources had come to a halt 
and N ew  Granada faced an acute and prolonged exchange crisis.
In October of 1829 a Bogotá newspaper complained that the adoption of 
European modes and new luxury consumption, and the consequent 
excess of imports was draining the country of currency and producing 
economic depression. It claimed that from 30,000 to 50,000 pesos in cur­
rency left Bogotá alone in each weekly mail to make exchange payments 
for imported goods. As a result, the only coin left in the capital was macu­
quina, irregular silver pieces coined during the Wars of Independence. 
Media of international exchange were becoming increasingly costly, with 
gold then at a premium of 8 percent over macuquina. And with the short­
age of coin in circulation interest rates had shot up, on occasions it was 
alleged as high as 6 or even 10 percent per month. By the beginning of the 
1830s almost every part of the country, including gold-mining Antioquia, 
complained of the drain of currency abroad and the acute scarcity of 
media of exchange in local markets.9
8 Informe del diputado consular de M ompox,Nov. 5,1830, ANB, Miscelánea Gene­
ral, República, vol. 161, fols. 195-197; Wills (1831: 19-24, 27-28).
9 “Política,” Eco del Tequenthama (Bogotá, Oct. 18, 1829); report o f Rufino Cuervo, 
Governor o f Bogotá province, to Minister o f Interior, Dec. 15,1831, and report of 
JoséTiburcio Pieschacón andjoaquín Escovar to Governor o f Bogotá, Dec. 5,1831, 
ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols.75-86; “Unos campesinos sobre 
el comercio, agricultura e industria,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Mar. 
4, 1832); “Numerario,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Dec. 6, 1832);
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The trade crisis and exchange shortage o f the early 1830s affected N ew 
G ranada’s dom estic econom y in many ways. Observers in the early 1830s 
noted that the greater im portation o f m anufactured goods had adversely 
affected not merely N ew  G ranada’s urban artisans but also many in the 
rural population as well. Since m ost weaving in N ew  G ranada was done 
by wives and children o f peasant farmers, the flood o f  foreign goods had 
tended to underm ine the dom estic ecom ony o f small agricultural house­
holds.1“ By 1833 and 1834 N ew  G ranadan com m entators were also noting 
that the im portation o f foreign cotton  and w oolen cloth, by reducing 
local manufactures, had cut dem and for locally-grown cotton  and wool 
fibres.11 The total effect was to  im poverish, and thus reduce the consum er 
power, o f  rural familes in the eastern cordillera.
More broadly, the expenditures o f  consumers at large, instead o f circulat­
ing in the local economy, were being drained off in exchange payments. 
Because o f  the drainage o f  currency, and perhaps also the diversion o f 
larger proportions o f  upper- and middle-class income into the consum p­
tion o f  im ported semi-durables, there was a general softening o f dem and 
for local agricultural com modities. Agriculturalists were caught between 
extremely high credit costs and a stagnant or shrinking local market. 
Many farmers who sought to  sell their properties in order to free them ­
selves from accumulating debts found this was impossible. There were 
no buyers. According to a w riter in Bogotá in 1832, as the am ount o f coin 
in circulation declined, properties lost their dem and: “The property- 
ow ner w ho previously counted on ten thousand pesos, now  has only five 
[...] N obody buys, because he lacks m oney [...] public places are filled 
with notices, inviting buyers o f  various properties w hose owners have 
no t been able to  pay the accumulated in terest [on their debts] and they 
are ruined for lack o f  a buyer.”12
The agricultural crisis o f  the tim e was reflected in widespread agitation 
for lowering the rate o f in terest on censos (qu it rents owed to ecclesiastical 
and other institutions) from  5 to  3 percent per annum . Owners o f agricul­
tural as well as urban properties contended that, because o f  the fall in
“Comercio,"Mercurio Colombiano: Rap el Político, Comercial, Literario y  Religioso (Carta­
gena, Sept. 13,1832); report o f  junta de agricultores to Governor o f  Bogotá, Jan. 19, 
1833, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 134, fols. 683-688.
10 Report to Minister o f Interior, Bogotá, Nov. 9,1831, Constitucional de Cundinamarca 
(Bogotá, Nov. 20, 1841).
11 Report o f junta de agricultores to Governor, Bogotá province Jan . 19,1833, ANB, 
Miscelánea General, República, vol. 134, fols. 683-688.
12 “Numerario,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Dec. 16, 1832).
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the price o f  com m odities, the scarcity o f currency, the lack o f investm ent 
possibilities, and the lack o f an easy m arket for agricultural products, 
profits on real property had so dim inished that they did not produce 
even 3 percent.13
Aside from  the drain o f currency, another problem  in the external sector 
o f which upper-class Colombians com plained was the m onopolization 
o f the im port trade by foreign, principally British, merchants. In the early 
1830s cries o f pro test rose in chorus from som e o f  New G ranada’s m ost 
im portant trading cities -  from Bogotá, Medellin, Rionegro, Honda, and 
M om pox.14 Mercantile interests in these cities claimed that British m er­
chants were on the verge o f totally eliminating New G ranadan ones from 
the im port trade. British merchants, the Granadans pointed  out, were 
supplied on consignm ent w ith goods directly from G reat Britain, at fac­
tory prices, and with the added advantage o f export discounts.1" British 
merchants also had advantages in shipping and exchange costs as, being 
engaged in direct trade with G reat Britain, they could buy up such trop i­
cal exports as New G ranada produced, sending them  in backhaul to 
England. Granadan merchants, it was alleged, lacked the connections, the 
capital and the experience needed to  carry on the direct im port-export 
trade with England;
W hat native [hijo del pais] has the capital to undertake a trip to Europe [...]? The 
cost o f consignations and expenses in a country as costly as England would not 
permit any advantage whatever [to a Granadan merchant]. Although [...] one is 
not obliged to [...] [have a consignment agent in England], it is a complicated 
science. [...] a merchant needs relations in Scotland, a knowledge of the Manufac­
turers, to know by which route the goods must come, which goods Drobac has, 
and all this gibberish [...] All this obliges him to find a consignment agent, stay 
there [in Europe], and make great expenditures [...].16
Consequendy, at this time m ost (perhaps all but a few) G ranadan m er­
chants, bought their shipm ents injam aica from British m iddlem en and at 
considerably higher prices than in England. Granadan m erchants also had
13 “Reducción de censos,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Feb. 16,1834). See 
also “Interés legal de los censos,” Constitucional del Cauca (Popayán Ju ly  20,1833), 
and “Reducción de censos,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Apr. 6,1834).
14 Cartagena’s merchants seem not to have been concerned about this problem. For 
the views of mercantile interests in these six cities see ANB, Miscelánea General, 
República, vol. 161, fols. 171-206.
15 Francisco Antonio Imbrecht, Informe del diputado consular de Mompox, Nov. 5, 
1830, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fol. 200.
16 “Comunicado,” La Sangría (Bogotá, undated 1834).
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to  pay high freight and exchange costs as there was virtually no m arket in 
Jamaica for N ew  G ranada’s tropical products. G ranadan merchants, 
therefore, could buy in Jamaica only with gold or currency, and they often 
had to charter ships especially to carry their goods to N ew  Granadan 
ports. Their freight costs from Jamaica, they claimed, were equal to  those 
o f  goods com ing directly from Europe. British merchants in New G ra­
nada, with cost advantages allegedly as high as 20 percent, thus were 
easily able to undercut their Granadan com petitors.'7 D uring the early 
1830s it was frequently contended that British merchants, with their cost 
advantages, were ruthlessly cutting prices, forcing the Granadan ones to 
sell at a loss, in som e cases driving them  into bankruptcy.18 
It should be noted  here that, although the com plaints o f  creole m ercan­
tile in terest undoubtedly had some foundation, they exaggerated the 
extent o f foreign mercantile dom ination. In 1825 the foreign merchants 
did have considerable advantages in the im port trade, but by the early 
1830s — precisely the tim e when N ew  G ranadan protests against foreign 
mercantile m onopoly were m ost bitterly sounded — the foreign m er­
chants appeared to be losing their hegemony. In 1832-33 less than 13 p er­
cent by value o f  the im ported goods brought into Cali were introduced 
under the names o f  merchants with non-Spanish surnames. The im port­
ers responsible for the largest im portations by values were Granadans, 
with the sole Britisher in the list holding only fourth place.19 
D ata from Cartagena for 1825 and 1837 confirm the view that foreign 
commercial dom inance tended to wane in the 1830s — in part, apparently, 
because o f declining European interest in the meager N ew  Granadan 
trade. The Cartagena data also indicate, however, that neither in 1825 nor 
in 1837 did the foreigners hold a total monopoly. W hile foreign m er­
chants dom inated the direct trade from Europe, som e o f the larger New 
G ranadan ones brought shipm ents directly from Europe throughout the 
period. In addition, foreign merchants as well as N ew  G ranadan ones 
continued throughout the 1830s to depend som ew hat upon shipm ents 
from Jamaica and other Caribbean ports.2" By 1839-41, however, it appears
17 Imbrecht, Informe del diputado consular de M ompox, ANB, Miscelánea General, 
República, vol. 161, fob 200; “Comunicado,” Ltf Sangría (Bogotá, undated 1834).
18 Reports o f diputados consulares o f Honda, Oct. 25,1830; Mompox, Nov. 5,1830; 
Bogotá,June 7,1831; Medellin Ju ly  2,1831; and R ionegrojuly 9,1831, ANB, Misce­
lánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 171-201. O f these, the Mompox report, fols. 
200-201, is m ost explicit on this issue.
19 “Alcabala de Cali,” remitido, Constitucional del Cauca (Popayán, Nov. 16, 1833).
20 Importations from New York consisted primarily o f flour and other provisions 
and British textiles which British manufacturers dum ped in New York at prices
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that creole merchants were well linked with Europe and were bringing 
the large majority o f  merchandise shipm ents from European ports.21 
W hile the British merchants were the objects o f  much upper-class ire, it 
was also recognized that the problem  o f price-cutting, commercial losses, 
and bankruptcy was much m ore than a m atter o f foreign m erchant com ­
petition. They were part o f  a general econom ic contraction produced in 
large part by the im pingem ent o f the increasingly productive Atlantic 
economy.
In 1830, as New G ranada’s economic crisis deepened, a survey conducted 
through the Consulado o f  Cartagena polled representatives o f m ercan­
tile interests in the principal commercial tow ns, inquiring as to the causes 
and possible remedies o f  the country’s econom ic maladies. Five o f the 
seven tow ns whose responses have survived (Bogotá, Medellin, Rio- 
negro, M om pox and H onda) com plained o f the m onopolization o f trade 
by foreign merchants and called for restrictions on the foreigners’right to 
carry on trade. Two o f  the reports (Medellin and Rionegro) also advoca­
ted prohibiting the im portation o f some finished goods that were also 
produced by New G ranadan artisans; in Cartagena, the officials o f  the 
Consulado opposed such prohibitions as contrary to  good economic 
policy but supported  the use o f heavy tariff duties for the same purpose. 
O thers either were lukewarm to such restrictions on com merce or 
explicitly opposed them .22
The economic crisis that began at the end o f the 1820s did not im m edi­
ately lead m ore than a few in the New G ranadan elite to  favor the devel­
opm ent o f m odern manufacturing as a means o f reducing dependence 
upon im ported goods. Few thought that manufacturing was even a pos­
sibility given New Granadan conditions. The diputado consular o f  the city 
o f  A ntioquia announced in his report that he would no t even discuss the 
question o f factories “because I consider them  very rem ote in the infan­
tile situation in which these countries find themselves.”23
lower than in England. According to contemporary sources, when the British mills 
were short o f cash, and facing excessive inventories, they preferred to unload their 
surpluses in New York to prevent their real situation being discovered in England. 
( “Derechos diferenciales,” El Argos [Bogotá, Mar. 11, 1838]).
21 “Relación de las cantidades que adeudan a esta aduana varios individuos de la pro­
vincia de Bogotá por derechos de plazos cumplidos,” Aduana de Santa Marta, Mar. 
9, 1842, Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, May 8, 1842).
22 ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 172-173, 180-182, 185, 188-190, 
200, 204-205.
23 Pablo Pardo, Informe del diputado consular de Antioquia, Oct. 29, 1830, ANB, 
Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fol. 209.
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T he only report show ing some interest in establishing m odern factories 
was that o f Bogotá. B ogotá’s diputado consular, Bernardo Pardo, believed 
it was hopeless to  try to protect the traditional cottage weavers, who 
lacked bo th  the capital and the machinery required to m eet European 
com petition. He looked with m ore favor on the establishm ent o f 
m odern factories, though he did no t express excessive confidence in this 
sort o f  enterprise. Pardo pointed  out that New G ranada’s population was 
no t yet dense enough to provide the labor surplus that was considered 
necessary to make factories economically attractive; agriculture could be 
expected to  continue to absorb alm ost all the country’s scarce capital and 
labor. However, he continued, factories “should not for this reason be 
neglected, but rather [we should attem pt] the establishm ent o f  those 
that produce articles o f the m ost general consum ption, and that are the 
easiest to undertake.” Making perhaps the first m odest form ulation in 
New G ranada o f the idea o f founding m odern factories for im port sub­
stitution, he declared that the country ought not to depend on others for 
products that are indispensable. He particularly recom m ended the 
encouragem ent o f factories for the production o f com m on cotton and 
w oolen cloth, using the concession o f privileges or patents as an instru­
m ent.24
Confronting the country’s trade imbalance, many in the N ew  Granadan 
elite tended to  see salvation less in the protection o f dom estic manufac­
turing than in the developm ent o f its exports o f  tropical products. In 
order to p rom ote exports, the country’s econom ic leaders gave particular 
em phasis to  the need for freeing export agriculture from  the burden of 
the diezmo (ten percent tax on gross agricultural p roduction) and other 
taxes.25
Many o f the com m unities also em phasized the need to  im prove roads 
and river navigation. Transportation im provem ent had some implica­
tions for the prom otion  o f  exports. It m ight make exporting from the 
population centers isolated in the m ountainous interior at least less 
impossible. It should be noted, however, that the primary concern of 
m ost o f those urging im provem ents in transportation was to  make even 
easier the flow o f  im ported goods.20
24 Bernardo Pardo, Informe del diputado consular de Bogotá Ju n e  7,1831, ANB, Mis­
celánea General, República, vol. 161, fol. 205.
25 ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 172-173, 189, 209.
26 ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 171-173,181,184-185,190,198- 
199, 206, 209.
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II
The concerns expressed in the reports o f  the diputados consulares o f 
1830-31 represented the opening round in the first substantial debate 
over the protection o f m anufacturing to be held in N ew  Granada after 
independence. It proved to be practically the only one to  occur before the 
1880s, because in the intervening period the ideological hegem ony of 
free trade liberalism became such that no one in the elite dared to, o r p o s­
sibly was inclined to, make a serious and strenuous defense o fprotection . 
Only during the period 1830-35 did the forces o f protectionism  have 
enough weight am ong the N ew  G ranadan elite even to  respond ade­
quately to the predom inant free trade liberalism.
It should be noted  here that the real issue in the debate over protection 
was w hether the im portation o f certain goods m ight be prohibited. 
Transportation costs from the coast to  interior markets were such that 
m oderate to high tariff duties (20 to  40 percent o f  value) represented 
only a fractional increase in the costs o f  im ported goods. Only outright 
prohibitions or very high duties (100 percent o f value or m ore) were 
likely to  have any significant effect on the flow o f goods. In the debates 
o f the 1830s, therefore, the true protectionists were those urging prohibi­
tion o f im ports or extremely high duties, the free traders those urging 
m oderate or even “protective” duties.
The protection o f dom estic manufacture had been a serious considera­
tion for N ew  G ranada’s political leaders during the 1820s. Though they 
did no t adopt an aggressively protectionist stance in the 1820s, the high­
est councils o f governm ent did discuss measures for protecting the 
country’s artisans.27 The onset o f  the crisis o f  the early 1830s, however, 
made the cause o f protection  a publicly agitated question. The first con­
cern o f  the New G ranadan elite (as early as 1830) was to  protect their 
own position vis-à-vis foreign merchants in the m arketing o f  im ported 
goods.28 B yjune and July o f 1831, however, concern am ong the elite had 
becom e broader and som e were beginning to  express alarm about the 
im pact o f  European im portations on cottage weavers or on urban arti­
sans.2” Finally, by O ctober o f  1831 the drain o f  currency in exchange pay­
27 Meeting o f Consejo de Gobierno, Bogotá, Feb. 19,1829, ANB, Libro de registros 
del Consejo de Estado, fols. 158v.-l60v.
28 Reports o f diputados consulares o f Honda, Oct. 25,1830; and Mompox, Nov. 5, 
1830, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 184-186, 194-200.
29 Reports o f diputados consulares o f Bogotá,June 7,1831; Medellin,July 2,1831; and
196 Frank Safford
m ents for im ported goods was beginning to be recognized as a major 
problem . From the end o f 1831 through 1834, the loss o f  currency was a 
source o f w idespread worry; even as late as 1838 it was being discussed as 
a continuing problem .50 As o f N ovem ber 1831, the scarcity o f  currency 
and the need to protect local manufacturers had equal w eight in a strong 
call for protection byjosé Ignacio de Márquez, then Secretary o f  Finance.31 
As spokesm en in widely-scattered parts o f the republic pushed for vari­
ous forms o f  protection in 1831, an anti-protectionist response began to 
develop. The m ost elaborate argum ent against protection, and in favor o f 
relying primarily on the export economy, was presented by William 
Wills, who had come to New G ranada as representative o f a British com ­
mercial house. W ills’ argum ent, published in a 74-page pam phlet in 1831 
and reprinted in El Constitucional de Cundinamarca, set forth the main 
lines o f the anti-protectionist position, many o f  which were adopted and 
repeated by New G ranadan leaders th roughout the next 30 years. 
Wills took  issue with the protectionists about the nature and causes of 
the presen t crisis. He denied that the increased flow o f im ported goods 
and paym ent for them  with precious metals necessarily m eant the loss o f 
circulating media. As New Granada was a gold-producing (and to a lesser 
degree a silver-producing) country, it ought to  be exporting precious 
metals rather than hoarding them . If the country currently was experien­
cing a shortage o f credit and capital, it was not because coin was being 
drained from the country but because the Wars o f Independence and 
subsequent political instability had created so much insecurity that capi­
tal had fled or was in hiding (Wills 1831: 53-55).
For the rest, Wills offered the standard liberal argum ent, N ew  Granadan 
weavers could not possibly com pete with m ore efficient British manu-
Rionegro,July 9, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 171-173, ISO- 
182, 203-206.
30 Early expressions o f concern about currency drain appear in José Tiburcio Piescha- 
cón and Joaquín Escovar, report to Governor o f Bogotá province, Dec. 5,1831, and 
report o f Rufino Cuervo, as Governor o f Bogotá province, to Minister o f  Interior, 
Dec. 15, 1831, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 75-86. See also 
“Numerario,” Constitutional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Dec. 16,1832); “Comercio,” 
Mercurio Colombiano (Cartagena, Sept. 13, 1832); report o f junta de agricultores, 
Bogotá province Jan . 19,1833, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 134, fols. 
683-688. For a later article on the subject, “Consideraciones sobre la falta de num e­
rario que se experimenta en la Nueva G r a n a d a La Crónica Semanal (Bogotá, Feb. 
16, 1838).
31 Memoria de Hacienda, Colombia (1831) excerpted in Ospina Vásquez (1955: 153- 
154).
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facturers, even with the aid o f 100 percent tariffs. The only result o f  a p ro ­
tectionist policy would be to  burden consumers in order to favor a 
minority o f producers (Wills 1831: 43-51). Instead, N ew  G ranada should 
play to its comparative advantage, which lay in tropical agriculture.32 
W ills’ views were lauded by many N ew  Granadans already inclined to 
embrace the doctrines o f European liberalism. Some New Granadan eco­
nomic liberals, indeed, were m ore dogmatic than Wills in their espousal 
o f  the free market. W hereas Wills believed that the current shortage of 
capital m ight be resolved with m ore political stability and the applica­
tion o f  enterprise to  m ining and export agriculture, som e N ew  G rana­
dans were sanguine enough to believe that the problem  would solve 
itself. A contributor to El Constitucional del Cauca placed his faith in the 
idea o f  a perfect m arket-adjusted m onetary equilibrium. If m oney were 
being exported, it was clearly because the New Granadan m arket con­
tained m ore than it could use; to try to  retain it would artificially raise 
prices. The free flow o f currency would be “the true regulator o f  the 
am ount o f  currency necessary for the m ovem ents o f com m erce;” it 
w ould “liberate us o f  the superabundance o f unused precious m etals;” 
and it w ould “maintain constantly the quantity at the level o f  the needs of 
circulation.” Possibly such unbounded  faith in the principles o f political 
econom y extended to relatively few o f the N ew  Granadan elite. But 
many certainly agreed with Wills that the central solution to  the coun­
try’s econom ic problem s m ust be the developm ent o f  its exports o f  tro p ­
ical products. T he m ost ardent exponent o f  this view was El Constitutio­
nal de Cundinamarca, whose editors were am ong the closest political 
associates o f General Francisco de Paula Santander. Frequently they 
repeated W ills’ charge that the country’s failures as an exporter were 
attributable to lack o f enterprise.33
A considerable part o f  Bogotá’s econom ic elite — both  landowners and 
merchant-capitalists — rejected the argum ents o f Wills and his Granadan 
adherents. Replying m ore o r less directly to Wills, a junta o f  twenty-eight 
m erchants and landowners asserted that the econom ic principles estab­
lished by European authors for conditions in the old world “are not
32 Wills (1831: 43-51). Aspects o f the argument were restated by Wills in Constitucio­
nal de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Jan. 8, 1832).
33 “La estracción del dinero aumenta nuestra ruina?” Constitucional del Cauca 
(Popayán, Mar. 16,1833); “Comercio,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá,Jan. 
15, 1832); “Prohibiciones comerciales,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, 
Apr. 28, 1833); “Progreso del comercio en Cartagena,” Constitucional de Cundina­
marca (Bogotá, Apr. 10, 1836).
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applicable in the new.” “Experience [...] sadly has convinced us that the 
theories o f the European econom ists have been the ruin o f  this country.” 
The junta o f  landowners, lacking a counter-theory to p it against the doc­
trines o f  political economy, simply po inted to  a num ber o f alarming 
developm ents. W hile native merchants and local artisans w ere being 
ruined by consum er goods, increased consum ption o f  im ports had 
caused an annual loss o f circulating m edia to the am ount o f 2.5 million 
pesos in the interior provinces alone; nationally the drain undoubtedly 
was much greater than the total production o f  the country’s mines. This 
drain was the true explanation o f the lack o f  capital in the country; it was 
no t that people had squirreled away their funds. Finally, while in theory 
New G ranada’s im ports o f  manufactures should be stimulating exports 
o f agricultural products, in fact it was not w orking out that way. The fact 
was that transportation costs over m ountain m ule-paths did not perm it 
the export o f any product except those with a high value for weight. The 
upshot o f liberal theory was to deny the population o f the interior the 
possibility o f  producing anything. “In w hat kind o f  work,” they asked 
plaintively, “can Granadans em ploy them selves?”The situation raised in 
their m inds the specter o f drastic social upheaval; if things did not 
im prove, they foresaw “turbulence, revolutions, robbery, murders, inse­
curity for the G overnm ent and for the citizenry.” The junta agreed with 
Wills on the need to try to  expand exports, but they also called for severe 
restrictions upon foreign merchants, high tariff duties on luxury p ro d ­
ucts no t made in N ew  Granada, and the prohibition o f im ports o f any 
manufactured goods similar to those m ade in N ew  Granada.34 
U ndoubtedly the m ost strident argum ents for prohibition in the debates 
o f the early 1830s were presented by Dr. José Félix de Merizalde, a feisty 
Bogotá physician w ho devoted at least as much tim e to the nation’s 
politics as he did to the practice o f medicine. A violent polemicist, M eri­
zalde carried on a running fire o f acrid attack on all things foreign, from 
British merchants to  the goods they sold to  liberal econom ic ideology. 
Merizalde viewed the doctrines o f political econom y as a hideous inven­
tion o f  the foreign devil, contrived to bankrupt the nations upon which 
England preyed. Jean-Baptiste Say, he claimed, was paid by England “to 
bewitch” the o ther nations o f  the w orld; although Say’s doctrines had 
been com batted by o ther authors, the English had succeeded in prevent­
ing the spread o f the contrary works, “in order to be able to m onopolize
34 Report o f junta de agricultores, Bogotá, Jan. 19,1833, ANB, Miscelánea General, 
República, vol. 134, fols. 683-688.
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com merce.” Merizalde also asserted that the British were prepared to 
“lose millions o f pesos as if they were pennies” in order to  ruin the new 
factories o f o ther nations so as later to be able to im pose m onopoly 
prices. And he noted  with venom ous perspicacity that the British had 
go tten  dow n to a science the practice o f making cheap goods: not only 
did they undersell national products but consumers had to  buy m ore of 
them  because they were o f such poor quality that they soon w ore out. 
( “Every day they take greater care that the weaving in their goods be so 
bad that after little use they are destroyed so that the consum ption is 
greater ...”).35
All o f the bile that Merizalde poured  ou t against the British (o r anyone 
else to w hom  he turned his atten tion) undoubtedly underm ined his 
effectiveness as a polemicist. Yet amid the many shafts he loosed against 
free trade, a num ber hit the mark. His scatter sho t p rotest thus ultimately 
helped to build the full case for protectionism . Merizalde was one o f the 
first Granadans to note that the British themselves had no t practiced 
their liberal preachm ents when they were founding their own manufac­
tures; at the ou tset the British had built their industry by prohibiting 
im ports. A m ong his many observations, Merizalde also made a series of 
isolated points on the role o f manufacturing in the econom y o f the in te­
rior that, if  drawn together, would have constituted an argum ent for in te­
grated econom ic developm ent through manufacturing. Merizalde p o in t­
ed out the im portance o f local weaving in providing a m arket for raw cot­
ton and raw w ool produced in the interior which, because o f  transporta­
tion costs, could not conceivably be exported. He also noted, as did o ther 
contem poraries, the social cost o f  the decline o f hand weaving, including 
the danger o f increasing idleness and underm ining the habits o f  industry 
am ong the weaving population .36 Some o f these observations were later 
developed m ore systematically by N ew  G ranada’s m ost lucid advocate o f 
protection, Alejandro Osorio.
Between the tw o schools — those who placed their faith in the wisdom o f 
political econom y and the possibility o f developing exports, and those 
who believed that local realities had invalidated these doctrines — there 
were others w ho recognized that the crisis was a real one but could not 
bring them selves to foresake the established truths o f  political economy. 
Such individuals tended to  look to  moral suasion for a solution. Thus, for 
example, Lino de Pombo, who objected on principle to  any form o f p ro ­
35 “Comercio extranjero,” El Pensador Granadino (Bogotá, Mar. 17, 1833).
36 Ibid.
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tection, urged self-discipline upon his countrym en; they should volun­
tarily cut dow n on their consum ption o f im ported luxuries. Accordingly, 
Pombo, as well as o ther editorialists m ore favorable to protection, th u n ­
dered against the new dom inion o f fashion and the upper-class passion 
for foreign luxuries not previously known in New Granada.57 
A nother characteristic form o f  moral support for national m anufacturing 
as an alternative to  protection was exhortation to  use N ew  Granadan 
textiles. El Constitucional de Cundinamarca, which opposed the pro tec­
tionist m ovem ent o f the early 1830s, nevertheless found space to praise 
those m em bers o f  the upper class w ho induced their sons to w ear G rana­
dan cloth. And General Santander, though reluctant to  support tariff p ro ­
tection, and resolutely opposed to  im port prohibitions, sought to  stim u­
late consum ption o f  national manufactures by arriving in Bogotá to  as­
sume the presidency wearing a suit o f  cloth woven in N ew  G ranada.38 
W hatever the long-term  balance between protectionists and free traders 
in New Granada, the commercial crisis that so preoccupied the upper 
class in 1831 gave som e tem porary force to protectionism . The pro tec­
tionists were also aided fo ra  time by the fact thatjosé Ignacio de Marquez
— a native o f Tunja, in the wool-weaving region, and a m an o f  p ro tection­
ist views — exercised the executive pow er as Vice President through m ost 
o f  1832. The protectionist surge lasted some m onths after M árquez left 
office, however, w ith dem ands for outright prohibition emanating not 
onlyfrom  Bogotá, bu t also from Cartagena,Tunja,M edellin, and Popayán
— the country’s largest tow ns and centers o f political opinion.39
The strength o f  protectionist sentim ent in 1832 and 1833 was such that 
President Francisco de Paula Santander and his Secretary o f Finance, 
Francisco Soto, both  fundamentally sym pathetic to  free trade principles, 
trim m ed toward protectionism  in their messages to the national C on­
gress in 1833. Soto opposed prohibiting any im ports, on principle as well 
as because o f the consequence o f  artificially raising prices to consumers. 
But, while affirming that N ew  G ranada ought not to be engaged in 
manufacturing given its agricultural potential, he granted that those 
provinces that had dedicated themselves to cotton weaving ought to
37 “El lujo,” Constitutional del Cauca (Popayán, Nov. 10, 1832).
38 “Vestidos,” Constitutional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Oct. 21, 1832).
39 “Comercio,” Mercurio Colombiano (Cartagena, Sept. 13,1832); “Sobre la miseria p ú ­
blica,” Constitucional de Cundinamarca (Bogotá, Nov. 25, 1832); M. R., “Editorial,” 
Constitucional de Boyacá (Tunja, Jan. 27, 1833); “Congreso,” El Pensador Granadino 
(Bogotá, Feb. 10, 1833); “Pobreza,” Constitucional de Antioquia (Medellin, Feb. 10, 
1833); Constitucional del Cauca (Popayán, May 11, 1833).
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have the right to a livelihood. He therefore urged a balanced tariff policy 
that would offer som e protection  to  the weavers w ithout excessively 
burdening the country’s consumers. President Santander gave equally 
tepid support to a m oderate m ove in the direction o f protection. Popu­
lar opinion in New Granada dem ands this measure,” he said, “and the 
executive believes it should be adopted, if for no other reason than to 
learn through our own experience.”40
W ith considerable pressure for protection  coming from the m ost im por­
tant provinces, and at least lukewarm support for a move in this direction 
from  Santander and Soto, the Cham ber o f Representatives in 1833 passed 
by an overwhelm ing margin (34 to  8) a measure providing for the p roh i­
bition o f a num ber o f items. This measure, however, represented the 
zenith o f protectionism  in N ew  Granada. The bill was beaten dow n in 
the Senate and the Cham ber o f  Representatives accepted the Senate al­
ternative o f protective duties on som e goods but no prohibitions. ’
The Congress o f 1833 placed high duties on foreign flour and ready­
made clothes but left national textiles relatively unprotected .42 Thus the 
principal beneficiaries o f the 1833 protectionist tariff were the urban arti­
sans, w ith cottage weavers receiving little practical support despite the 
occasional rhetorical wringing o f  hands about their fate am ong members 
o f the elite in the period.
The m ore favorable treatm ent o f w heat and artisans’ goods than o f  cot­
tage textiles may have been based purely on considerations o f political 
e c o n o m y - th e  conviction that the cottage weavers were doom ed in any 
case, while the urban artisans and the w heat growers o f  the interior 
retained som e comparative advantage, or at least some com petitive 
strength. O ne may surmise, however, that the congressional decision was 
also shaped by the fact that the wheat-growing landowners and the 
urban artisans had to be reckoned with much m ore than the cottage 
weavers, whose political significance was lim ited not only because they 
were poor, illiterate, and scattered in the countryside but also because 
they were for the m ost part w om en and children, contributors to rather 
than the main supports o f  peasant house holds. Urban artisans, by con-
40 Memoria de Hacienda, Colombia (1833: 8-9); “Mensaje del Presidente del Estado de 
la Nueva Granada al Congreso en la sesión de 1833,”Mar. 1,1833, Constitucional del 
Cauca, suplemento al núm. 34 (Popayán,July 6, 1833).
41 ACB, Cámara, Actas, 1833, no. 5, m orning session of Apr. 23,1833, fols. I6l-l62v.; 
ACB, Cámara, Actas, 1833, no. 5, morning session of May 30,1833, unnum bered 
folio.
42 Duties listed in Ospina Vásquez (1955: 170).
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trast, were relatively well educated, often at least literate, and they were 
concentrated in a few towns where they could organize and make their 
views heard. And, in these years, they did so, through petition, if no t by 
o ther means.43
W ith the defeat o f  the bid for prohibition in 1833, m ost supporters o f 
strong protection left the field to the trium phant free traders o f the 
Adm inistration. A few diehards in Bogotá kept up the fight, however. 
T he m ost notable o f  these was Alejandro Osorio, w ho presented the 
m ost carefully reasoned and well-structured argum ent for protectionism  
to appear in N ew  Granada in these years. O sorio’s argum ent, a few salient 
points o f  which are resum ed here, is striking for its preoccupation with 
full em ploym ent and the developm ent o f consum er power, them es that 
have bulked large in tw entieth-century economics. O sorio’s concern for 
these m atters contrasts strikingly with the then-dom inant doctrines of 
political economy, which focused singlemindedly upon the efficiencies 
o f the free m arket and therefore tended to exalt com merce as practically 
the sole measure o f  prosperity.
O sorio began his analysis by proclaiming that N ew  G ranada was in fact 
n o t a nation but a colony o f  G reat Britain. “A country w ithout agriculture 
or industry, whose limited com merce is in foreign hands is, as I see it, a 
colony, merely a market for the foreigner.” Indeed, it was the best kind o f 
colony (from  the p o in t o f view o f the manufacturing pow ers) because it 
was self-governing and therefore required no administrative expendi­
tures from its exploiters.44
In O sorio’s view the fundam ental error o f the free traders lay in focusing 
on consum ption, that is, in their emphasis on the benefits o f  the free m ar­
ket in lowering prices. As long as New G ranada had nothing to export, 
O sorio po inted  out, consum ption o f foreign goods “consists in simply 
handing over its limited means o f  exchange for the goods consum ed.”45 It 
was the loss o f circulating media that was responsible for the lack o f 
enterprise with which free traders so frequently charged their com pa­
triots. W hen there were m ore m edia o f exchange and prices were higher
43 Petition from Bogotá shoemakers, calling for prohibition o f imports, Dec. 29,1831, 
A N B ,Miscelánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 124-125; petition of 49 Bogotá 
artisans, representing nine trades, undated, probably sometime 1832, ANB, Misce­
lánea General, República, vol. 161, fols. 120-123; petition o f 24 Cartagena artisans, 
representing five trades, Feb. 24, 1832, ANB, Miscelánea General, República, vol. 
161, fols. 112-115.
44 El Proletario, no. 1 (Bogotá, undated, 1834).
45 Ibid.
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(in the 1820s), profit incentives had stim ulated New Granadans to 
undertake new enterprises. N ow  these enterprises were languishing 
because o f  the current depression o f prices and the lack o f commercial 
m ovem ent in the country.16
Instead o f focusing on lowering the prices o f goods, O sorio contended, 
the first concern o f  governm ent policy should be to obtain full em ploy­
m ent, w ithout which the mass o f the people w ould lack the pow er to 
consum e anything. He pointed out that for the com m on workm an it did 
no good for prices to  fall drastically if he were unem ployed or underem ­
ployed and could not afford the goods at any price. M anufacturing, O so­
rio argued, was im portant as a means o f creating jobs and building con­
sum er power. W hile agricultural developm ent was also im portant, a 
purely agricultural country in his view could never be rich. (He noted  the 
contrasting cases o f  Poland and Russia and o f England and the United 
States as examples.) A purely agricultural country could not becom e rich 
because not all agricultural surpluses could be exported. Some, like dairy 
products and vegetables, required nearly markets. In purely agricultural 
economies, consequently, prices and therefore productivity were held 
dow n. W here there were factories, however, industrial labor provided a 
m arket for foods while the factories them selves offered markets for agri­
cultural raw materials. A m ore profitable agriculture in turn would create 
a broader, m ore prosperous, m arket for manufactures. Emphasizing the 
com plem entarity o f m anufacturing and agriculture, O sorio thus called 
for the developm ent o f a balanced econom y.17
O sorio recognized that manufacturing in New G ranada could not soon 
becom e com petitive w ith that in the industrial nations. But it was neces­
sary at least to start down the road to  industrialization.IS In defense o f  the 
protection required to  found infant industries, he suggested that the free 
traders had better examine m ore closely w hat the industrial nations were 
actually doing rather than accepting on faith w hat they were saying. Elab­
orating on a p o in t earlier noted by Merizalde, he detailed the many ways 
in which England had pursued restrictive policies, apparently w ithout 
excessive concern for the costs these implied for British consumers. He 
noted  am ong these measures the special protection conceded to  the 
sugar o f Jamaica and Barbados, in prejudice to that produced by New
46 Ibid.
47 Osorio noted some other advantages o f manufacturing: it provided year-round 
employment and also offered employment to women and children. El Proletario, 
no. 6 (Bogotá, May 11, 1834); see also no. 3 (Apr. 13, 1834).
48 Ibid., no. 7 (May 11, 1834).
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G ranada and other Latin American countries. If  the British were not 
going to throw  open their markets to  N ew  G ranada’s products, why 
should N ew  G ranada treat British goods so indulgently ? N ew  Granada, a 
p o o r nation, seemed to be engaging in a perilous philanthropy tow ard 
the w orld’s richest one. Was it wise, O sorio w ondered, for N ew  Granada 
to  attem pt to lead the way in the strict observance o f the principles o f 
political econom y?49
Osorio called for a general plan for coherent national econom ic grow th, 
em phasizing increased em ploym ent through the com plem entary devel­
opm ent o f  m anufacturing and agriculture. He noted  that many o f the 
policies being pursued by the Santander adm inistration would have the 
effect o f reducing levels o f em ploym ent rather than increasing p rosper­
ity. Santander’s reductions in the size o f  the army would simply augm ent 
the masses o f  the unem ployed. The division o f  Indian com m unity lands 
would mean that these lands would remain uncultivated for lack o f  m ar­
kets for theirproducts. W orst o f  all, the Santander adm inistration’s policy 
on transportation developm ent was to  give particular attention to  roads 
usable in foreign trade. If successful, this policy would have the effect 
simply o f  increasing the flow o f im ports, further reducing em ploym ent. 
O sorio elsewhere em phasized the need to give primary attention to the 
developm ent o f  internal com merce rather than o f  foreign trade. He 
no ted  that the internal commerce o f France was fifteen times as great as 
its foreign trade; even England’s dom estic trade exceeded its foreign 
com merce in value, and the British had spent im m ense sums on the 
developm ent o f internal transportation; the U nited States was also m ak­
ing strenuous efforts to build roads and railroads that w ould facilitate 
internal com merce.50
O sorio’s views are o f interest not because they were influential but 
because they were so exceptional, for the direction o f  the argum ent as 
well as for its clarity and perception. O sorio’s emphasis on em ploym ent 
and on manufacturing as a consum er o f  agricultural products was fore­
shadowed in a fragmentary way by som e o f  the earlier com m entaries 
em anating from  the Bogota elite. But O sorio developed this vision in a 
much m ore systematic fashion, presenting an argum ent that for the first 
tim e in N ew  G ranada could match in coherence the doctrines o f  political 
economy.
49 Ibid., no. 1 and no. 9 (May 29, 1834).
50 Ibid., no. 4 (Apr. 20, 1834) and no. 6 (May 4, 1834).
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As interesting as his views are in retrospect, O sorio’s was a voice crying in 
the wilderness. After the only partially successful protectionist push of 
1833, free trade views and the export-im port orientation easily dom inat­
ed the remaining years o f the Santander adm inistration. W hen José Igna­
cio de Márquez returned to pow er in 1837, there was some recrudescence 
o f sentim ent for protection from foreign interests. But it was expressed 
in renewed requests for the protection o f New G ranadan merchants 
through the m odification o f the 1825 reciprocity treaty w ith G reat Brit­
ain.51
T hroughout the decade from 1834 to 1844 duties on cotton  cloth 
rem ained quite low — only 15 percent if brought in New G ranadan or 
British bottom s. By contrast, duties on goods produced by urban artisans 
were clearly protective in these years. D uties on books, for example, 
d ropped from the high level o f 200 percent o f original value that 
obtained briefly in 1833-34, but between 1834 and 1840 they rem ained in 
the neighborhood o f 80 to  100 percent o f value. Only during one brief 
m om ent, from 1844 to 1847, did cotton cloth enjoy protectionist duties. 
The tariff o f 1844 provided specific duties on ordinary cottons that were 
the equivalent o f  about 100 percent o f  original value.5' Presumably this 
burst o f protectionism  was p rom pted by the establishm ent in these years 
o f a cotton  mill in Bogotá by som e o f the capital’s leading citizens. 
The Bogotá mill, however, did not long enjoy this protective duty. In 1847, 
F lorentino González, a vigorous exponent o f  liberal political economy as 
early as the 1830s, became Secretary o f Finance and led a m ovem ent for 
the removal o f the last vestiges o f protection. G onzález’s 1847 tariff 
brought drastic reductions in duties on com m on cloth and finished 
goods alike. Free trade remained the dom inant econom ic passion o f  the 
Colombian elite until the presidency o f Rafael N úñez in the 1880s. 
The dedication o f the Colombian elite to  free trade from the middle of 
the 1840s through the 1870s is understandable because in these years the 
country was experiencing a grow th in exports. T he sudden loss o f inter­
est in the protection o f national manufacturers after 1833 dem ands some 
explanation, however. T hroughout the 1830s N ew  G ranada’s exports 
rem ained insignificant, so that free traders were no t in a position to 
dem onstrate the success o f their doctrine at least in the experience of 
their own country.
51 “Consideraciones sobre la falta de numerario que se experimenta en la Nueva 
Granada,” La Crónica Semanal (Bogotá, Feb. 16, 1838).
52 Tariff duties in Ospina Vásquez (1955: 170).
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O ne reason for the sudden collapse o f protectionism  may lie in the fact 
that som e o f the interests that had joined in support o f  a m ore restrictive 
policy found their anxieties allayed during the 1830s. Between 1831 and 
1833 the pressures for protection had been augm ented by the fears o f 
N ew  Granadan merchants that the British were taking over the im port 
trade. A lthough the interests o f these native im port m erchants clearly 
were no t served by a policy o f  prohibitions, their cries o f  alarm had 
helped to create an atm osphere favorable to protection. D uring the 
1830s, however, as evidence p resented earlier indicates, native merchants 
were im proving their position in the im port trade vis-à-vis foreigners. 
This fact possibly took som e o f  the steam o u t o f  the building pressure for 
restrictive trade policies. The principal tariff issue between 1834 and 1839 
concerned not protection but the question o f  w hether discriminatory 
duties should be levied on U nited States ships, a form  o f  discrimination 
that appears to have helped N ew  G ranadan m erchants to dom inate trade 
between U nited States and G ranadan ports during the 1830s.
A nother factor in the decline o f  protectionism  undoubtedly was the 
awareness o f  many in the N ew  Granadan elite that the cause o f the cot­
tage weavers was hopeless. The realities o f  the British industrial machine, 
as well as the doctrines o f political economy, condem ned them . But if the 
cottage weavers were out-m oded, m odern factories m ight be considered 
m ore deserving o f support, from  the standpoint o f  econom ic m odern­
ization. W hy, when m odern factories were being attem pted between 
1832 and 1840, was no attem pt made to provide protection for these 
elite-owned enterprises that seemed m ore in tune with the patterns of 
the future? Possibly m ost m em bers o f  the elite, while sym pathetic to 
these enterprises, fundamentally doubted, in accord with William W ills’ 
analysis, that they could make it.
Finally, it is possible that the great majority o f the elite simply believed 
that the doctrines o f political econom y were right and could no t success­
fully be contravened. Interestingly, som e o f  those w ho invested in the 
Bogotá factories and played administrative or entrepreneurial roles in 
them  were am ong those who opposed protection and w ho believed that 
N ew  G ranada’s destiny was to be an agricultural rather than a manufac­
turing nation.
